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Abstract
If control of their rms allows entrepreneurs to derive private benets, it also allows
other controlling parties. Private benets are especially relevant for venture capitalists,
who typically get considerable control in their portfolio rms, but not for banks, which
are passive loan providers. We incorporate this di¤erence between banks and venture
capital and analyze entrepreneursnancing strategy between the two. We nd that, in
all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private benets more choose banks
while the rest choose venture capital. Thus, bank-nanced entrepreneurs allocate more
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ts while VC-backed entrepreneurs have higher
protability.
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1 Introduction
In the standard incomplete nancial contracting models or models of capital structure and
control (such as Aghion and Bolton (1992), Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv
(1988), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1989)), entrepreneurs derive private benets because of
their control in their rm but all outside nanciers are assumed to care only about con-
tractible returns. This approach is a good approximation when entrepreneurs raise funds
from one type of nancier. However, when it comes to analyzing the entrepreneursnanc-
ing strategy between active and passive sources of nance, the possibility that one type of
nancial intermediary has access to returns that are noncontractible to the other changes
the nature of nancing decisions.
Our contribution in this paper begins by noting that if control allows an entrepreneur
to enjoy private benets, it also allows other controlling parties in the rm to enjoy them,
especially active nancial intermediaries. This hypothesis is particularly relevant for VCs.1
Because VCs take signicant control in their portfolio rms, they may have access to private
benets to the extent of their control. Yet, private benets are noncontractible to banks be-
cause as passive loan providers they do not have any control in the rm. We incorporate this
di¤erence between banks and VC to a model of start-up nancing and analyze entrepreneurs
nancing strategy between the two. We nd that, when banks and VC coexist in an economy,
in all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private benets of control more choose
banks while the rest choose VC. Thus, bank-nanced entrepreneurs allocate more resources
to tasks that yield private benets while VC-backed entrepreneurs have higher protability.
A VCs role in the portfolio rm clearly goes beyond the simple provision of nance.
Typical contracts allocate considerable control of the rm to the VCs. As equity providers,
they usually have seats in the board of directors. They have rights to use rm property and
be actively involved in management. They participate in forming the organizational struc-
ture and establishing rms strategies. They help nding customers, business consultants,
lawyers, suppliers, and even further nancing. The contracts also give them the right to be
involved in employing or ring key managers and other personnel. Some contracts may even
give them the rights to replace the founding entrepreneur with an outside manager.2
There are certain facts that imply VCsconcern about private benets, which are not
1Hereafter, we use VC for both venture capital and venture capitalist.
2See Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008), Gompers and Lerner (2000), Gorman and Sahlman (1989),
Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), Lerner (1995), and Sahlman (1990) for evidence
on all of these.
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necessarily monetary.3 VCs usually care about not only the current deal with a portfolio rm
but also the e¤ect of this deal on their reputation in fund-raising and attracting promising
projects (Gompers (1996)). They may prescribe investment strategies to hedge the risk in
their own portfolio rather than to maximize returns from a rm. Many of them, especially
corporate-VCs, have multiple goals. Prot is denitely the major goal but they may also
have strategic goals. For example, Intel wants to promote technologies that use computing
power; university-VCs care about academic prestige of technological advancements from
their schools; government-VCs are concerned with innovation and employment (Brander,
Egan, and Hellmann (2009)); bank-VCs care about future loan clients (Hellmann, Lindsey,
and Puri (2009)). VCs may also use the information that they have about a portfolio rm
to help it engage in strategic alliances with other rms in their portfolio (Lindsey (2008)).
Some may care about sitting in the board of directors of many rms, which they may view
as prestigious positions for their career or as a source of individual power that may yield
private benets. As well-connected individuals in specic industries and controlling board
members in their portfolio rms, they may inuence decisions so that rms purchase services
and inputs, employ managers and other employees, from their network.
To understand the implications of the di¤erence between hands-on contracting with
VCs and hands-o¤ contracting with banks, we consider entrepreneurs who are seeking
nance for their start-up projects. Projects yield not only contractible returns that are ob-
servable and veriable before a court but also noncontractible returns that are nontransfer-
able and nonveriable. For the ease of explication, we use monetary returns for contractible
returns and nonmonetary returns for noncontractible returns, even though noncontractible
returns can also be monetary such as resources secretly diverted from the rm (see, for exam-
ple, Hart (1995, p. 101-106)). Nonmonetary returns accrue only to those who have control in
the rm. Therefore, banks are not concerned with them. The VC attaches certain value to
them, whose degree is common knowledge, but entrepreneurs di¤er in their privately-known
concern about them.
Loan contracts with a bank take the simple debt form under asymmetric information.
When an entrepreneur chooses bank-nancing, he hires a manager as an agent and operates
his project as the sole principal. Contracting with the manager involves moral hazard as
his e¤ort is not observable. Depending on his own valuation of nonmonetary returns, the
3Even though, private benets are one of the building blocks of nance theory, the literature has been
weak in dening and measuring them. This is mostly because they are not easy to observe, not because there
is lack of interest in the topic. If they were observable, they would not be private.Despite the di¢ culties,
Dyck and Zingales (2004) managed to quantify them by using some indirect techniques. They nd that the
value of control is on average 14% of the equity value of a rm, and it can be as high as 65%.
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entrepreneur o¤ers an employment contract to the manager such that the manager optimally
allocates his e¤ort between two tasks: the task that yields the monetary returns and the
task that yields the nonmonetary returns, both of which use up resources.
Contracting with the VC is more involved. If the entrepreneur chooses VC-nancing, he
rst o¤ers a xed compensation along with an ownership share to the VC. If the VC accepts
this o¤er, she e¤ectively becomes a co-principal in the project with bargaining power (in the
subsequent decisions) given by her ownership share. Thus, she becomes a controlling party
in the rm who may have di¤erent preferences than the entrepreneur, which is captured
in the model by her valuation of nonmonetary returns. To come to an agreement on how
to have the rm managed by the manager, as co-principals, the VC and the entrepreneur
bargain over how much weight to attach to nonmonetary returns in designing the optimal
employment contract o¤er to the manager.
We rst show that the VC contract may take three forms. Consider an entrepreneur
who value nonmonetary returns more than the VC. If his project yields monetary returns
that are su¢ cient to pay o¤ the VC, the contract takes the simple debt form in which he
surrender no ownership of the rm, but if not, the contract takes the equity form in which he
provides some ownership share and xed compensation to the VC in exchange for the start-
up capital.4 Thus, equity provision is in general attributable to ex post wealth constraints
of entrepreneurs. When an entrepreneur gives an ownership share to the VC, he does so
voluntarily, and this automatically gives the VC some control in the rm to the extent of
her ownership share in the rm (or even higher in practice).5 However, when the VC values
nonmonetary returns more than the entrepreneur, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to sell
the rm to the VC regardless of the level of monetary returns. In such cases, the contract is
more like an existing companys acquisition of the start-up.
We then identify the two Nash Equilibria of the model when both banks and the VC are
operative in the market, one of which is strict and the other is not. The strict Nash Equilib-
rium is always monotone, which means that entrepreneurs who value nonmonetary returns
more always raise funds from banks while the rest choose the VC. Hence, in equilibrium,
bank-nanced entrepreneurs divert more resources to tasks that yield nonmonetary returns
while VC-backed rms have higher internal rate of return.6 The other equilibrium is not nec-
4The VC in our model does not have any managerial input to the rm. If there were this additional
benet for VC-nancing, equity form would be even easier to obtain as an optimal contract.
5In many circumstances, VCscontrol power is much higher than the size of their ownership share. This
would make our results stronger.
6This result is in line with the conjecture that Hellmann (1998, p. 71) puts forward: [O]nly those
[entrepreneurs] willing to yield control rights choose venture capitalists, while the others seek nancing with
private investors or other more passive sources of funds.
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essarily monotone. In this equilibrium, those who value nonmonetary returns more choose
bank-nancing, those who value them less choose VC-nancing, but there is also a mass of
entrepreneurs in between these two who are indi¤erent between bank- and VC-nancing.
This third group in principle can choose between bank- and VC-nancing in anyway as long
as the loan market clears. Nonetheless, this equilibrium is obviously not a strict Nash Equi-
librium. Finally, there can also be another Nash Equilibrium in which there are only banks
o¤ering nance in the market. We show that all these three equilibria may coexist.
There are many papers focusing on the contracting between entrepreneurs and VCs and
even more on the contracting between entrepreneurs and banks. However, we know of only
four papers which get to the grips with modeling the entrepreneurs choice between raising
funds from a bank or a VC: de Bettignies and Brander (2007), Landier (2003), Ueda (2004),
and Winton and Yerramilli (2008), which we discuss in detail below. No paper we know of
focuses on the importance of the value that a VC (or any other outside nanciers in general)
may put on private benets.
In Ueda (2004), bank-nancing takes place in the presence of incomplete information on
behalf of the bank, which asks for collateral to screen. VCs have better ability to evaluate
projects and thus VC contracting is not subject to asymmetric information. But, the VC is
able to undertake the project by herself if the negotiation between the parties breaks apart.
As a result of this expropriation possibility, a tighter intellectual property protection makes
VC-nancing attractive. Moreover, entrepreneurs with little collateral nance from VCs.
Then, if there is perfect intellectual property protection or if entrepreneurs do not have su¢ -
cient collateral to provide, there will be no bank-nancing. She also nds that entrepreneurs
who raise funds from VCs have higher returns, in line with empirical observations.
Landier (2003) tries to explain the di¤erences in forms of start-up nancing across sectors,
regions, or countries. In his model, failed entrepreneurs are stigmatized whose degree can be
di¤erent in di¤erent sectors, regions, or countries. In a high stigma regime, entrepreneurs
choose risky projects because their outside options are bad. Then, VCs nance start-ups
since they can closely monitor entrepreneurs in this high risk environment. In a low stigma
regime, however, the outside options of entrepreneurs are better which lead them to choose
safe projects. Consequently, in this safer regime, banks nance start-ups with debt contracts
which require little monitoring.
Winton and Yerramilli (2008) provide an explanation for why banks use debt contracts
with little or no monitoring whereas VCs prefer convertibles with strong monitoring and
exercise of control. They incorporate the di¤erences in the risk and returns of rmscash
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ows to explain the relative use of VC and bank loans. They nd that entrepreneurs with
higher chances of good outcomes use less informationally intensive methods of nance such
as bank loans instead of more informationally intensive methods such as VC-nancing. VC-
nancing is attractive only when the entrepreneurs returns are highly risky and skewed,
with good outcomes being unlikely.
Finally, de Bettignies and Brander (2007) combined the entrepreneurs nancing choice
problem with the double moral hazard problem between the entrepreneur and the VC. Be-
cause they jointly provide costly e¤ort in the rm but do not fully benet from the return
on e¤ort as they only own a share of the rm, one important issue in VC contracting is
the presence of double moral hazard problem.7 In de Bettignies and Brander (2007), bank-
nancing involves debt nancing which does not distort entrepreneurs incentives to provide
e¤ort in his rm that he wholly owns. However, if he raises funds from a VC, his incentives
deteriorate because he surrenders an ownership share of his rm. In exchange, he gets VCs
managerial input. They nd that VC-nancing is superior only when the entrepreneur highly
regards the VCs managerial input or when his own e¤ort is not too important in the rm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 derives the
return expressions that are frequently used in the paper. Section 4 examines a bank-only
nancial system. Section 5 describes the details of contracting with the VC. Section 6
analyzes the entrepreneurschoice between bank- and VC-nancing and Section 7 concludes.
An appendix contains the proofs.
2 The Model
We consider a unit mass of risk-neutral and penniless entrepreneurs (indexed by E). Each
entrepreneur is endowed with a start-up project that requires K units of start-up capital
and a manager. Start-up projects yield not only contractible returns that are observable
and veriable but also noncontractible returns that are nontransferable and nonveriable.
As explained in the introduction, for the ease of explication, we use monetary returns for
contractible returns and nonmonetary returns for noncontractible returns, even though non-
contractible returns can also be monetary. As usual, we assume that entrepreneurs are
concerned with both monetary and nonmonetary returns from their start-up projects and
7Cassamatta (2003), for example, points to double moral hazard problem in explaining why VCs are
sources of both managerial advice and nance rather than specializing only in nancing while managerial
advice is provided by consultants independently. Inderst and Muller (2004) explore the double moral hazard
problem in a search model and explain short- and long-run dynamics of the VC industry.
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that both types of returns use up start-up capital.
Because entrepreneurs are penniless, they have to raise funds from outside nanciers.
There are two di¤erent sources of nance in this economy. The rst are risk-neutral banks
which provide loans in a competitive market. They are concerned only with monetary
returns from a project. If an entrepreneur gets bank-nancing and if his rm generates
enough monetary returns, he pays back (1 + r)K at the end of the period, where r is the
endogenously-determined lending interest rate. If his rm generates insu¢ cient monetary
returns to pay back the loan, then the bank seizes all monetary returns available in the rm.
Therefore, there is limited liability in bank-nancing.
The second source of nance is a risk-neutral VC (indexed by V C) who provides equity-
like nance in exchange for a xed compensation R, an ownership share 1  of the start-up
(where  2 [0; 1] is the share remaining to the entrepreneur), and certain control rights. Both
R and  are also endogenously determined and there is limited liability in VC-nancing, too.
The specication of the start-upsproduction technology is based on the standard multiple-
task moral hazard model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). There are two tasks in our
model, and if undertaken, the project yields two-dimensional, state-contingent, observable,
and veriable returns drawn from a normal distribution whose variance-covariance matrix is
assumed to be xed. The rst dimension of returns is monetary and the second dimension
nonmonetary. Nonmonetary returns accrue only to the principal(s) of a start-up project to
the extent of control in the rm, which is assumed to be proportional to the principals (or
principals) ownership share in the rm.
In case of bank-nancing, the entrepreneur is the sole principal and thus the sole bene-
ciary of the nonmonetary returns since contracting with a bank is just a lender-borrower
relationship where one party gets the loan in the beginning of the period from the other party
and pays it back at the end of the period along with the interest specied in the contract.
However, in case of VC-nancing, the VC becomes a co-principal in the project by acquiring
an ownership share (and control) in the rm. Therefore, both the entrepreneur and the VC
have access to the nonmonetary returns of the project in this case.
Our contribution begins by noting that, in addition to the entrepreneurs, the VC may
also value nonmonetary returns because of her control in the rm. Let coe¢ cient i, where
i = fE; V Cg, be the weight that principal i assigns to nonmonetary returns. Entrepreneurs
di¤er in terms of this privately-known coe¢ cient. In particular, we assume that the coe¢ cient
of the entrepreneur, E, is uniformly distributed over the interval [0; ] with pdf f() and
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cdf F ().8 However, the coe¢ cient of the VC, V C 2 [0; ], is common knowledge.
Figure 1: The sequence of events
Figure 1 shows the sequence of events. At the beginning of the period, entrepreneurs
privately learn their types (-coe¢ cients) and decide whether to raise funds from a bank
(denoted by B in the gure) or the VC. If an entrepreneur chooses bank-nancing, the
bank o¤ers him a standard debt contract. The game ends if he rejects this o¤er. If he
chooses VC-nancing, he o¤ers the pair (;R) to the VC along with certain control rights
in exchange for VCs supply of start-up capital. If the VC rejects this o¤er, the game ends.
Otherwise, it proceeds to the bargaining stage in which, as co-principals, the entrepreneur
and the VC decide how to have the rm managed by the manager hired. Their bargaining
powers are given by each co-principals ownership share in the rm. Bargaining between
them determines a coe¢ cient ? that they agree on, or in words how much weight to put
onto the task that yields the nonmonetary returns. If they do not get to an agreement, they
get their disagreement payo¤s: zero for the entrepreneur and C > 0 for the VC.9 Following
the bargaining stage, they o¤er an employment contract to the manager (entrepreneur does
this alone in the case of bank-nancing). The manager then decides whether to accept or
reject the o¤er, and in the case he accepts, he decides his e¤ort level on each task, which
neither the entrepreneur nor the VC can observe or verify. Finally, the publicly observable
and veriable state realizes and all contractual liabilities are satised by each party.
3 Returns from Start-up Projects
This section derives four important expressions that are frequently used in the rest of the
paper: an entrepreneurs net return from a VC-backed project (eq. (9)), the VCs net return
8Assuming uniform distribution of -coe¢ cients is without loss of generality because we later show that
the best responses of entrepreneurs are independent of shape of the distribution as long as it is continuous.
9Assuming a positive disagreement payo¤ for the VC is standard in the literature (among others see
Hellmann (1998) and Ueda (2004)).
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from that project (eq. (10)), a bank-nanced entrepreneurs net return from his project (eq.
(12)), and the monetary returns from that project (eq. (13)). Obtaining these expressions
requires describing the production technology in detail and deriving the optimal employment
contract with the manager under moral hazard.
Consider the managers problem. He has two tasks to complete: task 1 yields the mon-
etary returns and task 2 yields the nonmonetary returns. He is in a position to choose a
vector of e¤orts t = (t1; t2) that species the e¤ort he would like to provide on each task.
The private cost of providing e¤ort is given by T which is a continuous and strictly convex
function of t1 and t2. We particularize this cost function by assuming the following quadratic
form.
T (t1; t2) =
k1t
2
1
2
+
k2t
2
2
2
; (1)
where k1 and k2 are strictly positive parameters.
Given the managers e¤ort choice on each task, the returns are distributed with a two-
dimensional normal distribution with mean  : <2+ ! <2. We assume that  takes the
following linear form.
(t) =
 
1(t1)
2(t2)
!
=
 
1t1
2t2
!
; (2)
where 1(t1) is the monetary return, 2(t2) is the nonmonetary return, and 1 and 2 are
strictly positive parameters. The managers e¤ort choice creates a two-dimensional signal of
information, x 2 <2, observable and veriable by the principal(s): x = (t) + ", where " is
normally distributed with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix
 =
 
21 0
0 22
!
: (3)
The manager has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and thus his preferences are
represented by the utility function u(w) =   exp[ w], where  is the coe¢ cient of absolute
risk aversion. Under a compensation scheme w : <2 ! <, where w(x) is often referred
as the wage at information signal x, the managers expected utility is given by u(CE) =
 R +1 1 exp[ (w(x)  T (t))]dx, where CE denotes the certainty equivalent money payo¤ of
the manager under the compensation scheme w.
We normalize reservation utility of the manager to zero and restrict attention to linear
incentive contracts of the form w(x) = Tx + , where  2 <2+ and  2 <. Making use of
the CARA preferences and the normal distribution assumption, it is easy to show that the
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certainty equivalent of such a compensation scheme is given by
CE = (11t1 + 22t2) 

k1t
2
1
2
+
k2t
2
2
2

  1
2

 
21
2
1 + 
2
2
2
2

+ : (4)
Consequently, the managers optimal choice of the vector of e¤orts is
t = (t1; t

2) =

11
k1
;
22
k2

: (5)
Having derived the e¤ort choice of the manager, we are now in a position to calculate
the principals (or principals) optimal o¤er to the manager. The expected gross return of
principal i is given by
Bi(t) = 1(t1) + i2(t2) for i = fE; V Cg: (6)
We rst focus on the case of VC-nancing. We know that the entrepreneurs coe¢ cient on
the nonmonetary returns is E and the VCs is V C . Therefore, if the entrepreneur chooses
VC-nancing, the entrepreneur and the VC have to bargain to determine a coe¢ cient to be
used in formulating the optimal employment contact o¤er to the manager. Let this bargained
coe¢ cient be ?.10 Once they agree on ?, the preferences of the two principals are perfectly
aligned and thus the optimal contract o¤er is obtained from the solution of the following
(aggregated) maximization problem:
max
;

1(t1) + 
?2(t2)  T (t)  1
2

 
21
2
1 + 
2
2
2
2

: (7)
From Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), we already know that the optimal contract would
not render any surplus to the manager. Thus, the optimal constant intercept, , (which
does not a¤ect incentives11) must be such that the certainty equivalent is equalized to reser-
vation utility of the manager, which is zero. The rst-order conditions of the principals
maximization problem yield that
1 =
21
k1
21
k1
+ 21
and 2 =
22
k2
22
k2
+ 22
?: (8)
10We provide the exact expression for ? when we analyze the details of the bargaining between an
entrepreneur and the VC. Note that ? has to be in between E and V C .
11This is because we assume CARA preferences and thus there are no income e¤ects.
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Substituting (8) into (5) and using (2) show that the gross returns of the entrepreneur and
the VC are
E(
?) = 1 + 
? (2E   ?) 2 (9)
V C(
?) = 1 + 
? (2V C   ?) 2; (10)
respectively, where
1 =

21
k1
2
2

21
k1
+ 21
 and 2 =

22
k2
2
2

22
k2
+ 22
 : (11)
The gross return of the entrepreneur in case of bank-nancing can easily be obtained by
setting ? = E in (9):
^E(E) = 1 + 
2
E2: (12)
Eqs. (9), (10), and (12) contain not only the monetary returns of the project but also
the nonmonetary returns which accrue only to the principal(s) of a project. When deciding
on its lending interest rate, a bank is concerned only with the monetary returns of a project,
which we denote by ^ME (E). It is calculated simply by deducting the nonmonetary returns
of a project from the total returns from the project: ^ME (E) = ^E(E) E2(t2). Plugging
in the optimal levels of various terms gives
^ME (E) = 1   2E2: (13)
Note that the payment to the manager for him to supply the optimal level of e¤ort in the
task of the project that yields the nonmonetary returns are monetary and therefore they
appear in ^ME (E). Thus, the internal rate of return of projects owned by entrepreneurs
with higher coe¢ cients on nonmonetary returns are going to be lower since they allocate
more resources to task 2, the task that yields the nonmonetary returns.
In order to establish the non-emptiness of the participation constraint of the entrepreneur
(for both bank- and VC-nancing), the technology should be such that it is worthwhile
to operate the project regardless of the owner of the project. This requires making an
assumption on the face value of the project.12 The following assumption does the job.
12The face value of a project given by parameters f(`; k`; 2` )`=1:2; ; Eg is the value of the project
that does not depend on the identity of the owner of the project. Therefore, it must be a function of
only f(`; k`; 2` )`=1:2; g. Moreover, the face value of the project should contain only monetary returns.
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Assumption 1 (Face Value) The technology is such that the face value of the project sat-
ises 1  K + C.
This assumption says that the face value of the project is higher than the summation of
the start-up cost of the project and the VCs disagreement payo¤. When this is satised, it
is worthwhile to undertake the project as a sole owner and thus markets for funding start-up
projects can exist.13 We can have two other interpretations of this assumption. One may say
that it characterizes the payo¤ of the entrepreneur with coe¢ cient E = 0 or the monetary
return of that project, both of which is equal to 1, the face value of the project.
We close this section with the following lemma that records some technical results that
will be useful in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 1 (Properties of Return Functions) Consider the case in which V C  E.
Then, the following hold for i : [V C ; E]! <, i = fE; V Cg.
1. For all ? 2 [V C ; E], E(?)  V C(?) = ?(E   V C)2  0.
2. i is strictly increasing for any coe¢ cient lower than i, and strictly decreasing for
any coe¢ cient higher than i.
3. i is strictly concave on (0; 1) and @i(?)=@? evaluated at ?=i equals zero.
The proof of the lemma is trivial. While the rst conclusion follows from employing (9)
and (10), the others are due to the derivative ofi(?) being given by @i=@? = 22(i ?).
4 Bank-only Financial System
Analyzing an economy in which there is only bank-nancing sets a useful benchmark for
the examination of entrepreneurschoice between bank- and VC-nancing. As indicated in
Becker and Hellmann (2005), banks often play a dominant role in many countries. Even in the
US, the VC industry is relatively small even if it is well established. According to Berger and
Udells (1998) estimations, commercial banks provide 18:75% whereas VCs provide 1:85% of
Therefore, it is as if the project is operated by someone who does not care about the nonmonetary returns
(e.g., by the bank), thus as if i = 0. This means that the face value of a project given by parameters
f(`; k`; 2` )`=1:2; ; Eg is equal to 1.
13For bank-nancing, it is su¢ cient to assume that 1 > K, which is already satised when 1 > K+C.
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all small business nance. We later make some back-of-the-envelope calculations to match
these numbers and compare the results with those that derive in the case in which both
bank- and VC-nancing exist.
Consider now a bank-only nancial system. Let the equilibrium lending interest rate
chosen by banks be r?. The entrepreneur is the sole principal of the project if he is bank-
nanced, and his gross return in that case is given by (12). His net return is obtained by
deducting the loan repayment to the bank from the gross return of the project: ^E(E)  
(1 + r?)K. Therefore, a bank loan is desirable for the entrepreneur if and only if
1 + 
2
E2  (1 + r?)K: (14)
This is the participation constraint of the entrepreneur in the bank-loan market.
The net monetary return of the project is obtained by deducting the loan repayment
to the bank from the monetary return of the project given by (13): ^ME (E)   (1 + r?)K.
Therefore, an entrepreneur is able to pay back his loan in full if and only if
1   2E2  (1 + r?)K: (15)
Limited liability is binding for all entrepreneurs who do not satisfy this inequality. Let
coe¢ cient r? be such that 1 2r?2 = (1+r?)K. We assume that there exist nonnegative
lending interest rates solving 1 = (1+ r)K and 1  22 = (1+ r)K so that equilibria do
not derive trivially from binding constraints. Consequently,
r? =
s
1   (1 + r?)K
2
: (16)
Suppose all entrepreneurs seek for funding (which will eventually be a maintained as-
sumption). Then, the expected monetary return from a random loan applicants project is
calculated as follows:
E
h
^ME (E)
i
= E

1   2E2

= 1   2E

2E

= 1   2

(E [E])2 + var ()

= 1   2
 
2
2
+
 

2
12
!
= 1  
2
3
2:
Here E is the expected value operator and var the variance of the distribution of .
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In this setting, banks nance projects if the expected monetary return of the project
exceeds the cost of loanable funds. We normalize the risk-free interest rate to zero and thus
the cost of a loan of K units of capital is K. Hence, banks nance projects if the following
technological relation is satised.
1  
2
3
2  K: (17)
Bank loan market shuts down when this technological constraint is not satised, which is
nothing but a standard Akerlof (1970) or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) type of lemons
problem in which the average loan applicant is not protable and thus not creditworthy. For
what follows, we assume that the technological constraint in (17) holds.
Since the banking sector is competitive, banks make zero prot in equilibrium. Their
zero prot condition is given by
r?Z
0
(1 + r?)KdF () +
Z
r?
 
1   22

dF () = K: (18)
The rst term here is for entrepreneurs whose projects yield su¢ cient monetary returns to
pay back their loans. The second term is for those who are unable to pay back their loans in
full. In this case, limited liability applies and the bank conscates whatever left in the rm.
By manipulating (18) and using the fact that 1   2r?2 = (1 + r?)K, we get
3r?(r) =
3
h
1   23 2  K
i
22
 0: (19)
The right-hand side of this equation is nonnegative because 1   (2=3)2  K. Plugging
in the expression for r? from (16) and solving for r? gives the equilibrium lending interest
rate o¤ered by banks:
r =
1  	
K
  1; (20)
where
	 =
0@3
h
1   23 2  K
ip
2
2
1A2=3 : (21)
The zero prot condition assumes that there are entrepreneurs who cannot pay back their
loans (those with E 2 [r? ; ]) along with those who can (those with E 2 [0; r? ]) so that
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banks can break even. One can easily show that the participation constraint given in (14)
is satised for all entrepreneurs as long as 	  0, which is always the case as long as (17)
holds. The following proposition summarizes the ndings of this section:
Proposition 1 (Bank-only Equilibrium) Banks nance start-up projects if and only if 1 
(2=3)2  K. The equilibrium lending interest rate in a bank-only nancial system is given
by (20).
5 The Venture Capital Contracting
This section works out the details of contracting between an entrepreneur and the VC.
We start o¤ by considering the symmetric information case in which both E and V C
are common knowledge. This case is denitely too strong. In reality, the entrepreneurs
information about how much the VC values nonmonetary returns should be better than
the VCs information about how much each entrepreneur with whom she contracts values
nonmonetary returns. However, we later show that our results extend to the one-sided
asymmetric information case in which E becomes private information, which is indeed what
we plausibly assume throughout the paper.14 The basic reason for why our results hold also
in one-sided asymmetric information is dependent on the sequence of moves in the model
which makes truthful revelation of E a best response for the entrepreneur. We explain this
in detail at the end of this section.
The VC contracting involves two stages. In the rst stage, the entrepreneur o¤ers a
(;R) pair to the VC. If the VC accept this o¤er, the game proceeds to the second stage
in which the parties bargain over a ? that they will employ in running the rm. Their
bargaining powers are given by each partys ownership share in the rm. This is nothing
but a consensus on how to controlthe rm. As we have seen in Section 3, they o¤er an
optimal employment contract to the manager based on the ?-coe¢ cient that they agree on.
We now analyze these two stages starting from backwards.
14Similar assumptions are employed in the literature. For example, Admati and Peiderer (1994), and
Ueda (2004) assume that the relationship between the entrepreneur and the VC does not involve asymmetric
information; Chan, Siegel, and Thakor (1990) assume that the skills of the VC are publicly known. There
is also a growing literature on VCs reputation arguing that potential contractors learn a great deal of
information about the VCs preferences from the entrepreneurs who have previously worked with her (see
Gompers (1996)).
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5.1 Bargaining
Consider the stage in which the entrepreneur and the VC bargain over implementable con-
tracts. If the entrepreneur decides to raise funds from a VC, the entrepreneur o¤ers an
ownership share of 1   and a xed compensation of R to the VC along with some control
rights in exchange for VCs supply of the start-up capital K.15 Given the pair (;R) o¤ered
by the entrepreneur in the previous stage, the two principals bargain over the choice of 
(i.e., how much weight to put on nonmonetary returns in calculating the optimal employment
contract o¤er to the manager) whose admissible values are in between E and V C . If the
principals cannot agree on a ?-coe¢ cient, the project cannot go ahead and each principal
gets a return equal to their disagreement payo¤s, zero for the entrepreneur and C > 0 for
the VC.16 Thus, the pair of payo¤s to disagreement is d = (0; C).
The bargaining set S, the set of pairs of payo¤s to agreements, is dened by
S = f(E; V C) : E 2 [0;E()] and V C 2 [C;V C()]
for some  2 [min fE; V Cg ;max fE; V Cg]g: (22)
Then, the Pareto optimal frontier of S, denoted by z, is
z = f(E; V C) : E = E() and V C = V C()
for some  2 [min fE; V Cg ;max fE; V Cg]g: (23)
The following lemma establishes that the bargaining problem (S;d) is well dened and well
behaved.
15This o¤er scheme is similar to that of de Bettignies and Brander (2007). As they also mention, some
other papers allow the VC to make the o¤er while keeping the entrepreneur relatively passive. Our approach
is reasonably convenient in obtaining tractability and getting truthful revelation in the one-sided asymmetric
information case.
16We have shown that when C = 0, bank-nancing is optimal for the entrepreneur if and only if his
project yields monetary returns less than its startup cost K, which means that these entrepreneurs will
never be able to pay back their bank loans. As a result, banks never want to provide funds in the presence
of VC-funding since they can never breakeven in the start-up market. This lemons problem is why banks
may opt out from the nancing of high-tech start-up market. From a technical point of view, C is nothing
but a positive disagreement payo¤ which gives an extra power to the VC in the bargaining process. By
following Ueda (2004), we interpret C as the possibility of expropriation of the project by the VC when
the bargaining breaks up. Ueda (2004) nds that better intellectual property protection leads to less bank
nancing (and no bank-nancing if protection is perfect) whereas Landier (2003) claims the opposite. Our
results are consistent with Uedas nding. One may alternatively employ the following interpretation. VCs
usually specialize in certain industries and work with a portfolio of rms in that industry. They may well
have portfolio rms that are working on di¤erent facets of a similar idea. As a result, the VC may obtain
positive benets from seeing the project even though the bargaining breaks apart for a particular rm
simply because the information it acquires can be of use when working with other portfolio rms.
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Lemma 2 (Properties of Bargain Problem) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then,
S is nonempty, compact, and convex; and z is strictly concave.
The proof of the lemma is in Appendix A.1. We employ the utilitarian bargaining
solution (Thomson (1981)). According to this bargaining procedure, for (S;d) and for any
exogenously given coe¢ cients , (1 ) 2 [0; 1],  2 S is the utilitarian bargaining solution
of (S;d) if and only if
(E; 

V C) = N (S;d; )  arg max
(E ;V C)2S
fE + (1  )V Cg : (24)
Note that, by Lemma 2, there exists a unique solution to (S;d) for all  2 [0; 1] and thus
N (S;d; ) is a function. For notational purposes, let  be dened by i() = i for
i = fE; V Cg. The following lemma characterizes the bargaining outcome.
Lemma 3 (Bargaining Outcome) Suppose Assumption 1 holds and let without loss of
generality that V C  E. Then, for every  2 [0; 1], N (S;d; ) is a function, and  2
[V C ; E] is strictly increasing in  and is uniquely dened by  = E + (1  )V C.
The proof of the lemma is in Appendix A.2. Given (;R) o¤ered to the VC, who accepted
and supplied the start-up capital K, the net returns to the entrepreneur, ~E(;R), and the
VC, ~V C(;R), are
~E(;R)  E() R (25)
~V C(;R)  (1  )V C() +R; (26)
respectively, where  = E +(1  )V C . That is, the entrepreneur gets a  percent of the
rm but provides R to the VC as a xed compensation while the VC gets 1    percent of
the rm in addition to getting a xed compensation R.
Two comments on the actual determination of the joint -coe¢ cient are in order. First,
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) nd that VCs hold the majority of the board seats in 25.4% of
the start-up rms whereas the entrepreneurs seats form the majority in the 13.9% of them.
In the remaining 60.7%, neither the entrepreneur nor the VC have majority and in those
cases the VC and the entrepreneur mutually appoint directors for the swing votes. Whom
they should hire is a part of the bargaining process we employed.
Second, we implicitly rule out the use of covenants. Therefore, it is not possible to sep-
arate the allocation of cash-ow rights from the allocation of control rights. We assume
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one-share-one-vote norm and therefore the degree of control is proportional to the ownership
share. As a result, when the entrepreneur (VC) gets a greater ownership share, his (her)
share in the nonmonetary returns proportionally increases. The separation of the allocation
of cash-ow rights from the allocation of control rights is clearly an important feature of VC
contracts as mentioned in Hellmann (1998) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2003). However,
our goal in this paper is to analyze the consequences of having control in the rm, not how
the control is actually allocated. More importantly, it is well-known that VCs take propor-
tionately more control rights than their cash-ow rights in the rm, and such a specication
would clearly make our results stronger.
5.2 Entrepreneurs optimal o¤er
Having derived the bargaining outcome, we now consider the previous stage in which the
entrepreneur chooses his optimal (;R) o¤er to the VC. An optimal o¤er must maximize
entrepreneurs payo¤ subject to the participation constraint of the VC (i.e., ~V C(;R) 
K +C). It should also guarantee his own participation (i.e., ~E(;R)  0). As a result, the
maximization problem of the entrepreneur is given by
max
;R
fE() Rg (27)
s:t:
E(
) R  0 (28)
(1  )V C() +R  K + C: (29)
Suppose that (?; R?) solves this maximization problem. Then, we know from Lemma 3
that 
?
= ?E + (1   ?)V C . For brevity of notation, we dene ?  ?. The following
proposition characterizes the solutions of this maximization problem followed by a verbal
explanation. It turns out that, depending on the -coe¢ cients of the entrepreneur and the
VC, the optimal way of nancing can take the debt-form, the equity form, or the form of an
acquisition by the VC.
Proposition 2 (Optimal VC Contracts) Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The optimal of-
fers of the entrepreneur to the VC, (?; R?), are characterized as follows:
1. Entrepreneurs with E > V C:
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(a) (Debt-nancing) If 1   2E2  K + C, then
? = 1 and R? = K + C; (30)
and the entrepreneurs return is 1 + 2E2  K   C > 0.
(b) (Equity-nancing) If 1   2E2 < K + C, then ? is the maximum real number
in [0; 1] solving
 
(1  ?)2 2V C   (?)2 2E

2 = K +C  1 and R? = ?
 
1   (?)22

; (31)
and the entrepreneurs return is 2?E (?E + (1  ?)V C) 2 > 0.
2. Entrepreneurs with E = V C = :
(a) If 1   22  K + C, then
? 2 [0; 1] and R? = K + C   (1  ?)(1 + 22): (32)
In particular, both ? = 1 and R? = K + C (debt-nancing); and ? = 0 and
R? = K + C   (1 + 22) < 0 (acquisition) are among the solutions. The
entrepreneurs return is 1 + 22  K   C > 0.
(b) If 1   22 < K + C, then
? 2 f 2 [0; 1] : (1 2?)22  K+C 1g and R? = K+C (1 ?)(1+22):
(33)
Note that, ? = 0 and R? = K + C   (1 + 22) < 0 (acquisition) are among
the solutions. The entrepreneurs return is 1 + 22  K   C > 0.
3. (Acquisition) Entrepreneurs with E < V C: The entrepreneur sells the project for a
price of 1 + 2V C2  K   C to the VC, i.e.
? = 0 and R? =  (1 + 2V C2  K   C) < 0: (34)
The entrepreneurs return is 1 + 2V C2  K   C.
This important proposition, whose proof is given in Appendix A.3, requires a detailed
treatment of its ndings. Consider each case in turn. In Case 1, the entrepreneur values
nonmonetary returns more than the VC. Thus, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to keep as
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much shares as possible without violating the participation constraint of the VC. When the
project yields su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC (i.e., 1   2E2  K + C) as
in Case 1a, the entrepreneur is able to keep all shares (i.e., ? = 1) and pays whatever he
borrowed from the VC (i.e., R? = K + C) at the end of the period.17 The optimal contract
here takes the simple debt form. In Case 1b, the project does not yield su¢ cient monetary
returns to pay o¤ the VC (i.e., 1 2E2 < K+C). Thus, the entrepreneur cannot keep all
shares to himself. To be able to raise the necessary funds, he has to relinquish control to the
VC. What he does is then to provide some amount of shares just enough to guarantee the
VCs participation. Consequently, the optimal contract takes an equity form in which both
parties hold positive shares in the rm.18 Hence, equity provision by a VC is attributable to
ex post wealth constraints of entrepreneurs.
Skip Case 2 for the moment and consider Case 3. In this case, the VC values nonmonetary
returns more than the entrepreneur. Thus, it is optimal for the entrepreneur to sell as much
shares as possible to the VC. This is optimal because the value of the project is higher for the
VC because V C > E. The entrepreneur can make use of this situation by selling the whole
rm to the VC (i.e., ? = 0) at a price higher than his own valuation of the rm. This case
can be interpreted as a large rms acquisition of a rm rather than a VCs investment in her
portfolio company as a nancial intermediary, since the buyerattaches greater valuation
to the nonmonetary returns than the seller. To conceptualize, it is much like, say, a large
software company or a drug corporation acquiring a start-up rm that comes up with an
innovation.
Now consider Case 2 in which the -coe¢ cients of the two parties are the same (a measure
zero event). Since now the preferences are perfectly aligned, there are many possible solutions
(i.e., ? 2 [0; 1]). What is interesting is that both ? = 1 and ? = 0 are among those solutions
in the case in which the project yields su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC, which
is stated in Case 2a. Additionally, ? = 0 is among the solutions when the entrepreneur is
insolvent, as stated in Case 2b. These two points help us in comparing the payo¤s of the
entrepreneur in various situations in the proofs of the subsequent propositions.
We close this section by showing that Proposition 2 holds even under one-sided asym-
17The reason that R? does not include any markup over K + C is simply due to the fact that there is
no asymmetric information in the nancial contracting between the entrepreneur and the VC; otherwise the
no-markup result is a superuous detail which does not a¤ect our ndings.
18Of course, this abstracts from staging of investments (which occurs due to moral hazard problems
between the entrepreneur and the VC as shown in Bergemann and Hege (1998)) and convertible securities
as optimal contracts (which arises due to ne tuning of the incentives between the entrepreneur and the VC
when there is double moral hazard as shown in Schmidt (2000) or Repullo and Suarez (2004)). We abstract
from all these to highlight our results.
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metric information in which V C stays to be common knowledge but E becomes private
information.19 The timing of the model is particularly important in extending the results to
one-sided asymmetric information. First, the entrepreneur o¤ers (;R) to the VC, and they
then get into bargaining. While the VC does not know the entrepreneurs type, the entre-
preneur knows not only his own type but also the VCs type and he is the one who makes
the o¤ers. As a result, the entrepreneur leaves no surplus to the VC. That is, by a proper
choice of a (;R) pair in the stage before the bargaining, the entrepreneur always picks
a point on the bargaining frontier where the VC obtains his disagreement payo¤. Hence,
truthful revelation of his type E is optimal for him. We record this result in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 (Truthful Revelation) Suppose Assumption 1 holds and V C is common
knowledge but E is entrepreneurs private information. Then, the optimal choice of the
entrepreneurs o¤er to the VC is as specied in Proposition 2.
Because there is truthful revelation by the entrepreneur when E becomes his private
information, not only the optimal contract o¤ers specied in Proposition 2 but also the
bargaining outcome in the stage that follows the contract o¤er stage remain exactly the
same.
6 Banks versus Venture Capital
We now turn to the analysis of entrepreneurs choice between bank- and VC-nancing.
Existence of an equilibrium is never an issue in this economy. An equilibrium can easily be
established by having banks o¤ering a prohibitively high lending interest rate so that some
(or possibly all) entrepreneurs get nanced by the VC and the rest as well as banks remain
inoperative. Such an equilibrium is clearly not interesting. We rather focus on equilibria in
which both the VC and banks are operative in the market.20 We dene operativeness of a
nancial intermediary as follows.
Denition 1 (Operativeness) A nancial intermediary is operative if there exists a non-
zero measure of entrepreneurs who in equilibrium choose it for nancing their start-up
projects. Otherwise, it is inoperative.
19Even though a formulation with two-sided asymmetric information is very compelling, getting tangible
results from such a model proves to be very di¢ cult.
20We have already analyzed a bank-only nancial system in Section 4.
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The strategy of banks in this game is their lending interest rate, which is r? in equilibrium.
Let the entrepreneursequilibrium nancing strategy (i.e., their choice between bank- and
VC-nancing) be s?() : [0; ] ! fB; V Cg, where B denotes bank-nancing and V C VC-
nancing. Remember that we dene r? with (16), which implies a negative relationship
between r? and r?. Under our assumptions, there is a one-to-one map between the two and
therefore banks choosing a strategy r? is equivalent to choosing a r?-coe¢ cient.
Given limited liability, there are three possibilities for a bank. If a bank-nanced entre-
preneur generates su¢ cient monetary returns to pay back his loan, the bank is able to get
the principal and the interest, (1+ r?)K, in full. However, bank-nanced entrepreneurs with
E > r? will not be able to pay back their loans in full. In that case, the bank can conscate
only the monetary returns from the project, 1   22. Finally, if the entrepreneur chooses
VC-nancing, the bank obtains zero from him. Therefore, the payment of the entrepreneur
(with coe¢ cient ) to the bank, P (), is given by
P () =
8><>:
(1 + r?)K if s?() = B and   r?
1   22 if s?() = B and  > r?
0 otherwise.
(35)
In an equilibrium, each entrepreneurs nancing strategy is optimal given his -coe¢ cient
and the lending interest rate r?. The lending interest rate clears the bank loan market. The
VC gets her reservation utility given the o¤er (?; R?) of entrepreneurs who chooses VC-
nancing. Thus, we formally dene an equilibrium in this economy as follows.
Denition 2 (Equilibrium) A nancing strategy s?(), a lending interest rate r?, and an
entrepreneurs o¤er (?; R?) to the VC constitute an equilibrium if
1. s?() is an optimal choice for every  2 [0; ].
2. Banks break even: Z
E2f:s?()=Bg
(P () K) dF () = 0: (36)
3. For every E 2 f 2 [0; ] : s?() = V Cg, the VC gets her reservation utility C, given
the o¤er (?; R?).
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We later show that, in all strict Nash equilibria,21 all entrepreneurs under a -coe¢ cient
threshold choose VC-nancing while all those above this threshold choose bank-nancing.
We call such an equilibrium monotone. We formally dene monotonicity of an equilibrium
as follows.
Denition 3 (Monotonicity) An equilibrium (s?; r?; ?; R?) is monotone if there exists a
r 2 [0; ] such that all entrepreneurs with  < r choose VC-nancing and all entrepre-
neurs with  > r choose bank-nancing.
In a monotone equilibrium, banks play threshold strategies so that they expect to have
entrepreneurs with  > r in their loan applicant pool and set their lending interest rates
accordingly. There are two implications of monotonicity that deserves mentioning at this
point. First, r < r? must be satised in every monotone equilibrium, otherwise all bank
loan applicants would have negative NPV projects and banks could not break even. Second,
equilibria in which only one type of nancial intermediary is operative are trivially monotone.
Having dened what an equilibrium is, we now turn to the calculation of equilibria
in this economy. Remember that Assumption 1 guarantees that some projects yield high
enough monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC. We make two additional assumptions. The rst
assumption is about project returns and it guarantees that there are entrepreneurs whose
projects do not yield su¢ cient monetary returns to pay o¤ the VC.
Assumption 2 (Monetary Returns) The technology is such that the monetary returns
of the project satises 1   22 < K + C.
Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that there must be a C 2 (0; ) such that
1   2C2 = K + C: (37)
This means that some projects are creditworthy in the eyes of the VC while the rest are not.
The other assumption is that the VCs -coe¢ cient is (weakly) less than C since otherwise
the monetary returns generated when the VC is operating the project on his own is strictly
negative, which conicts with the fact that VC being a nancial intermediary.
Assumption 3 (VCs -coe¢ cient) V C  C.
21A Nash Equilibrium is strict if a player becomes strictly worse o¤ by deviating from his equilibrium
strategy.
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Our motivation for this assumption is straightforward. Even though VC-nancing is an
active source of nancing, a VC is still a nancial intermediary, which means that there is
a pecking order in her goals. Her major goal is to obtain monetary returns from nancing
start-up projects. Provided that she can earn positive monetary returns from a project, she
then tries to enjoy non-contractible returns by having control in the rm. Thus, nonnegative
monetary returns are necessary before enjoying nonmonetary returns.
The following lemma characterizes the best responses of entrepreneurs against a given
r? in each case. Because the payo¤ functions are continuous in all possibilities, we ignore
without loss of generality the equality cases. Since there is one-to-one map between r? and
r?, we focus on r?, which implicitly denes an r? value. There are three general cases to
consider: In case A, r? is such that r? is less than both V C and C . In case B, r? is such
that r? is in between V C and C . Finally in case C, r? is such that r? is higher than both
V C and C .
Lemma 4 (Best responses) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. The best responses of
an entrepreneur against a given lending interest rate, BRE(r?), are given as follows.
Case A (r? < V C < C):
 A  1 : For entrepreneurs with E < r? < V C < C, BRE(r?) = V C.
 A  2 : For entrepreneurs with r? < E < V C < C, BRE(r?) = V C.
 A  3 : For entrepreneurs with r? < V C < E < C, BRE(r?) = V C.
 A  4 : For entrepreneurs with r? < V C < C < E, BRE(r?) = B.
Case B (V C < r? < C):
 B  1 : For entrepreneurs with E < V C < r? < C,
BRE(r?) =
8><>:
V C if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
 B  2 : For entrepreneurs with V C < E < r? < C,
BRE(r?) =
8><>:
V C if r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
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 B  3 : For entrepreneurs with V C < r? < E < C, BRE(r?) = V C.
 B  4 : For entrepreneurs with V C < r? < C < E, BRE(r?) = B.
Case C (V C < C < r?):
 C  1 : For entrepreneurs with E < V C < C < r?,
BRE(r?) =
8><>:
V C if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
 C  2 : For entrepreneurs with V C < E < C < r?,
BRE(r?) =
8><>:
V C if r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
 C  3 : For entrepreneurs with V C < C < E < r?, BRE(r?) = B.
 C  4 : For entrepreneurs with V C < C < r? < E, BRE(r?) = B.
The proof of this lemma consists of a tedious check of all possible cases and is provided
in Appendix A.4. A very important point to mention here is that because this lemma has
no statement that stems from the distributional assumptions, our results are qualitatively
independent of our uniform distribution assumption. Another important point is that, re-
gardless of with whom she partners, the VC obtains an expected surplus of C and thus we
may dispense with optimization concerns for her.
Figure 2: Best responses Case A (r? < V C < C)
We use gures, which are quite useful in visualizing the best responses, to derive the
equilibria. Figure 2 shows the best responses in case A. In this case, by Lemma 4, all
entrepreneurs with  > C choose bank-nancing while those with  < C choose VC-
nancing. According to Denition 3, such an equilibrium is monotone with r = C , if it
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exists. However, in this case, all those with  > r? have negative NPV projects in the eyes
of banks, which means that banks cannot break even. Therefore, case A cannot happen in
general equilibrium.
Figure 3: Best responses Case B (V C < r? < C)
Consider now case B, which is depicted in Figure 3. Notice that C > r? in this
case, which implies r?K   C > 0. Therefore, it is immediate to see that the best response
for entrepreneurs with E 2 [V C ; r? ] is VC-nancing. Moreover, since V C > E for
entrepreneurs with E 2 [0; V C ], we can conclude that 2V C  2E > 0, which in turn implies
(2V C   2E)2 + r?K  C > 0. Thus, the best response for entrepreneurs with E 2 [0; V C ]
is also VC-nancing. According to Denition 3, such an equilibrium is monotone with
r = C , if it exists. However, as in case A, all bank-nanced entrepreneurs in this proposed
equilibrium have negative NPV projects from the perspective of banks, which means that
banks cannot break even. Hence, case B cannot happen in general equilibrium, either.
Figure 4: Best responses Case C(i) (V C < C = r?)
Finally, consider case C. Because the best responses of entrepreneurs change from VC-
nancing to bank-nancing exactly at C , we should check two possibilities, both of which
are shown to constitute an equilibrium. The rst possibility is a knife-edge situation in which
C = r?. The best responses of this situation are shown in Figure 4. One can easily see
that r?K = C when C = r?. Therefore, as in case B, for all entrepreneurs with E < V C ,
the best response is VC-nancing since (2V C 2E)2+r?K C > 0. However, this time, all
entrepreneurs with E 2 [V C ; C ] are indi¤erent between bank- and VC-nancing because
r?K   C = 0, and that is why this is a knife-edge situation. The only requirement that
is left to be satised for a general equilibrium is the zero-prot condition for banks, which
can be satised if entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent between the two strategies properly sort
26
themselves between bank and VC-nancing. We call such an equilibrium a type I equilibrium.
This equilibrium is not a strict Nash Equilibrium because entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent
between bank- and VC-nancing do not become strictly worse o¤ if they deviate from their
equilibrium strategy. We record these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Type I Equilibrium) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, there
can be an equilibrium such that r? = C=K and entrepreneurs with E 2 [0; V C) choose VC-
nancing, entrepreneurs with E 2 [C ; ] choose bank-nancing, and entrepreneurs with
E 2 [V C ; C ] choose between bank- and VC-nancing in any way until the markets clear.
This equilibrium is not a strict Nash Equilibrium.
Type I equilibrium is not necessarily monotone. Entrepreneurs with low -coe¢ cients
(i.e., E 2 [0; V C ]) prefer VC-nancing, entrepreneurs with high -coe¢ cients (i.e., E 2
[C ; ]) prefer bank-nancing but entrepreneurs in the middle-range can sort themselves in
any way as long as the zero prot condition for banks is satised.
Consider the monotone version of a type I equilibrium. Suppose that there exists a
r 2 [V C ; C ] such that entrepreneurs with E 2 [V C ; r] choose VC-nancing while
those with E 2 [r; C ] choose bank-nancing. Then, the zero prot condition is given by
CZ
r
(1 + r?)KdF () +
Z
C
 
1   22

dF () K
Z
r
dF () = 0: (38)
Substituting in r? = C=K, incorporating the uniform distribution assumption, and solving
r for yields
r =
C (K + C) +
 
  C

1  

3 3C
3

2   K
C
2 [V C ; C): (39)
We have already shown that in every equilibrium in which banks are operative r? 
C  V C since cases A and B proved to be nonexistent in general equilibrium. Moreover,
remember that r? and r? are negatively related and there are no other equilibria in which
banks are operative when r? < C . Thus, r? = C=K is indeed the highest equilibrium
lending interest rate in any economy in which both banks and the VC are operative. Then,
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Properties of Type I Equilibrium) Type I equilibrium is not necessarily
monotone. A monotone type I equilibrium is characterized by r? = C=K and (39). Moreover,
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r? = C=K is the highest equilibrium lending interest rate with minimum number of bank-
nanced entrepreneurs in any economy in which both banks and the VC are operative.
A special case of monotone type I equilibrium occurs when r = C in which all entrepre-
neurs who are indi¤erent between bank- and VC-nancing choose VC-nancing. However,
as in cases A and B, banks cannot break even in this case, which means that this special
case cannot happen in general equilibrium. That is why r 2 [V C ; C). Another special
case occurs when r = V C in which all entrepreneurs who are indi¤erent between bank-
and VC-nancing choose bank-nancing. This case is indeed a bank-only equilibrium which
we work out in Section 4.
Figure 5: Best responses Case C(ii) (V C < C < r?)
The second possibility in case C is the situation in which C < r?. The best responses
in this situation are shown in Figure 5. One can easily see that r?K < C when C <
r?. Because r?K   C < 0, all entrepreneurs with E 2 [V C ; C ] prefer bank-nancing.
However, the best responses of entrepreneurs with E < V C depends on whether (2V C  
2E)2 > 0 is greater or smaller than r
?K   C < 0 in absolute value. The best response
of entrepreneurs who satisfy (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C > 0 is VC-nancing while the best
response of entrepreneurs who satisfy (2V C   2E)2 + (r?K   C) < 0 is bank-nancing.
Therefore, there is a r 2 [0; V C ] in case C such that all entrepreneurs above r prefer
bank-nancing while the rest prefer VC-nancing. Moreover, banks can make zero expected
prots, which means that we obtain another equilibrium. We call such an equilibrium a type
II equilibrium.
The equilibrium lending interest rate in a type II equilibrium is found from the zero-prot
condition given in (36):
r?Z
r
(1 + r?)KdF () +
Z
r?
 
1   22

dF () =
Z
r
KdF (); (40)
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where r? 2 (C ; ). Incorporating the uniform distribution assumption and solving for r
yields
r =
r?(1 + r
?)K +
 
  r?

1  

3 3
r?
3

2   K
r?K
2 [0; V C): (41)
Moreover, the entrepreneur with coe¢ cient r must be indi¤erent between bank- and VC-
nancing, which means 1 + 2V C2   K   C = 1 + (r)22   (1 + r?)K. Then, the
equilibrium lending interest rate is given by
r? =
 
r
2   2V C2 + C
K
: (42)
A special case of type II equilibrium occurs when r = 0, in which case a bank-only equi-
librium is obtained. Our conclusions above lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Type II Equilibrium) Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, there
can be an equilibrium solving (16), (41), and (42) simultaneously. This equilibrium is a strict
Nash Equilibrium and it is always monotone.
There is an important corollary of this proposition.
Corollary 2 (Monotonicity of Strict Nash Equilibrium) All strict Nash Equilibria in
which both banks and the VC are operative must be monotone.
We have already mentioned that all Nash Equilibria in which only one type of nancial
intermediary is operative are trivially monotone. In addition, the above corollary nds that,
in all strict Nash equilibria in which both banks and the VC are operative, entrepreneurs who
value nonmonetary returns more choose bank-nancing while the rest choose VC-nancing.
Thus, it is always the case that bank-nanced entrepreneurs allocate more resources to task
2, the task that yields the nonmonetary returns, than their VC-nanced counterparts. This
also means that projects of the VC-nanced entrepreneurs have higher internal rate of return,
or they are more protable in other words.
We close this section with some start-up nancing arithmetic. Our purpose in these back-
of-the-envelope calculations is not to come up with the most realistic calibrated example but
rather to show the possibility of coexistence of type I, type II, and bank-only equilibria under
the same parameter specications.
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Consider a unit investment; thus, set K = 1. We assume C = 0:687, which implies a
lending interest rate of r? = C=K = 6:870% in a type I equilibrium. This interest rate is in
line with lending interest rates published in Federal Reserves statistical releases in 1990s.
We assume that the coe¢ cient terms is distributed between zero and 4:2; that is,  = 4:2.
Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimate the average value of private benets as 14% of the equity
value of a rm. We employ this as a rough measure of nonmonetary returns. So, if 2 = 1,
then 1 can be found from
E[E2]
E[1 + E2]
=
(=2)2
1 + (=2)2
=
14
100
; (43)
which yields 1 = 12:9.
Consider monotone type I equilibrium. From (39), we nd that r = 0:3672. This means
that the VC industry is active only in the 8:7418% of the economy. Is this a reasonable
number? By using the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF), Berger and
Udell (1998) nd the estimated distributions of equity and debt in the small business nance.
In their estimations, VCs share is 1:85% while the commercial banksshare is 18:75%. This
means that the relative size of the VC industry is 8:98%, which is pretty close to our back-
of-the-envelope calculation here.
Table 1: Numerical Example
Type I eq.
(monotone)
Type II eq.
Bank-only eq.
C 3.3486 3.3486 3.3486
r? 3.3486 3.3505 3.3598
r 0.3672 0.3097 0
r? 6,8700% 6.7402% 6.1180%
r= 8.7418% 7.3739% 0%
Parameters: 1 = 12:9, 2 = 1, K = 1, C = 0; 687
 = 4:2, V C = 0:33:
Table 1 reports the equilibrium outcomes for di¤erent equilibrium types. It turns out
that, under the same parameters, we have a type II equilibrium in which the size of the VC
industry is 7:3739% and the bank lending interest rate is 6:7402%. There is also a bank-only
equilibrium with a lending interest rate of 6:1180%. We thus have the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Coexistence of Equilibria) Type I, type II, and bank-only equilibria may
coexist.
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7 Conclusion
The existence of private benets on behalf of the entrepreneur is now a standard feature
of entrepreneurial nance models. Unlike banks, VCs are not passive investors. They are
specialized nancial intermediaries who take considerable control in their portfolio rms.
Protective provision terms in contracts allow them to veto transactions that are unfavorable
to them and board control gives them the ability to initiate new transactions.
The basic insight we underline in this paper is that if control allows the entrepreneur to
enjoy private benets, it also allow the VC to enjoy them. This paper is the rst to incor-
porate this di¤erence between active and passive sources of nance. Under this conjecture,
we focus on entrepreneursnancing strategy between banks and the VC. We nd that, in
all strict Nash Equilibria, entrepreneurs who value private benets more nance from banks
while the rest go to VCs. Therefore, VC-nanced entrepreneurs have higher internal rate of
return whereas bank-nanced entrepreneurs divert more resources in their rms to the task
that yield the private benets.
There are couple of important features of VC industry, which are already well stud-
ied in the literature, that we do not focus in this paper: intensive monitoring by the VC
(Gompers (1996)); staging of funding (Bergemann and Hege (1998), Cornelli and Yosha
(2003)); usage of special nancial instruments such as convertible securities (Marx (1998),
Repullo and Suarez (2004), Schmidt (2003)); syndication of VC investments (Admati and
Peiderer (1994), Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002), Lerner (1994)); and the exit route
of VCs (Black and Gilson (1998), Cumming (2008), Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher
(2006), Cumming and Johan (2008), Schwienbacher (2008, 2009)). A nice venue of future
research is to interact all of these features with the entrepreneurs choice between bank- and
VC-nancing to better understand the market split between the two.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Under Assumption 1, the non-emptiness is trivial, because (E(V C);V C(V C)) is in S.
Moreover, since all variables are continuous and [minfE; V Cg;maxfE; V Cg] is compact,
compactness of S follows. Since showing convexity of S is a standard exercise, it su¢ ces
to prove that z is strictly concave. To that regard, let  2 (0; 1) and ; 0 2 z with
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 6= 0 such that i = i() and 0i = i(0), for all i. For a contradiction, suppose that
~ =  + (1  )0 is in z. Then, there exists a ~ such that ~i = i(~). Hence, due to the
strict concavity of i, established in Lemma 1, we have
i(~) = i() + (1  )i(0) < i(+ (1  )0); i = fE; V Cg: (A-1)
Finally, without loss of generality, assume that E > V C . Due to the Lemma 1, we know
that E is strictly increasing and therefore (A-1) implies ~ < +(1 )0. This completes
the proof since (A-1) and V C being strictly decreasing imply ~ >  + (1   )0, which
delivers the necessary contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
The required conditions for the existence of the utilitarian bargaining solution have been
shown to be satised. Namely, S is compact and convex, d 2 S; and by Assumption
1, there exists some s 2 S with sj > 0 for j = 1; 2. Therefore, for any  2 [0; 1] we
have N (S;d; ) 6= ;. Moreover, since z is strictly concave, N (S;d; ) is a function. By
the Pareto E¢ ciency axiom of the utilitarian bargaining solutions, N (S;d; ) 2z for all
 2 [0; 1]. Recall that the denition of z implies that there is some  2 [V C ; E] such that
N (S;d; ) = (1; 2) = (E();V C()): This  is unique because is are one-to-one
(strictly monotone) functions of  on [minfE; V Cg;maxfE; V Cg] by Lemma 1. Trivially,
when E = V C ,  = E = V C . Without loss of generality, let E > V C . Therefore,
solving the following maximization problem with rst-order conditions
max
2[V C ;E ]
f [1 +  (2E   ) 2] + (1  ) [1 +  (2V C   ) 2]g (A-2)
delivers the conclusion upon observing that the objective function is linear, the boundary of
the constraint set is strictly concave by Lemma 2, and E   V C > 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
When Assumption 1 holds, the constraint set is non-empty and compact. Thus, there exists
a solution due to the continuity of the objective function given in (27). We should consider
three di¤erent cases E > V C , E = V C , and E < V C . Under each case, there are two
subcases, one in which the entrepreneur is able to pay o¤ the VC (i.e., 1  22  K +C)
and the other in which he is not (i.e., 1   22 < K + C). Consider each case in turn.
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Case 1: Suppose E > V C . When E > V C , ~E(;R) is strictly increasing and
~V C(;R) is strictly decreasing in . This implies that the participation constraint of the
VC holds with equality at the solution (?; R?). Thus, ignoring the participation constraint
of the entrepreneur for now, we can write down (27) as
max
(;R)
fE (E + (1  )V C) + (1  )V C (E + (1  )V C)  (K + C)g : (A-3)
By Lemma 1, this objective function is continuous in . Moreover, the entrepreneur is solving
a non-trivial utilitarian planners problem where the weights assigned to the principals must
be interpreted as their shares of the project.
Let 1   2E2  K + C (i.e., the monetary returns of the project when the entrepre-
neur operates it is greater than or equal to the start-up cost plus the VCs disagreement
payo¤). Because that the entrepreneur is solving a planners problem given in (A-3) and
E(E)   V C(V C) = 2(2E   2V C) > 0 by E > V C , the optimal solution is such that
the entrepreneur is the sole owner of the project. In expected terms, he pays o¤ the start-up
cost of the rm borrowed from the VC, K, and his disagreement payo¤, C, in full out of the
monetary returns of the project given by 1 2E2. This is the unique solution of this case.
Note that the participation constraint of the entrepreneur is satised in equilibrium:
1 + 
2
E2 R? = 1 + 2E2  (K +C)  1 + 2E2  (1  2E2) = 22E2 > 0: (A-4)
If 1   2E2 < K + C, then setting  = 1 violates the participation constraint of the
VC. As a result, the entrepreneur tries to compensate the VC with monetary payments as
much as possible in order not to distort the returns from the project (because considering
the planners problem given in (A-3) reveals that the social optimum requires that the
entrepreneur is allocated as much shares as possible). The remaining part is covered by
ownership shares to the VC, which the entrepreneur tries to keep as minimal. Consequently,
the entrepreneur gives all monetary returns he collects with his share  to the VC. Thus, for
any , R = (1   ()22). Consequently, the VCs payo¤ at  should satisfy

 
1   ()22

+ (1  ) (1 + (2V C   )2)  K + C: (A-5)
Here, the rst term on the left-hand side is the monetary returns that the entrepreneur
earns from the project and the second term is the VCs monetary and nonmonetary returns.
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Manipulating this yields

 
1   ()22

+ (1  ) (1 + (2V C   )2)  K + C
= 
 
1   ()22

+ (1  )  1   ()22+   (2V C   ) + ()22  K + C
=
 
1   ()22

+ 2 (1  )V C2  K + C: (A-6)
At the optimum, it must be that the VC does not obtain any surplus. As a result,
? 2 [0; 1]must be the maximal real number (because recall thatE(; R) is strictly increasing
in ) such that
2 (1  ?)?V C2 = K + C  
 
1   (?)22

: (A-7)
Note that the right-hand side of this equation gives the amount of monetary returns that
the entrepreneur is short on and the left-hand side gives the nonmonetary returns of the VC.
Manipulating this expression yields
1   (?)22 + 2 (1  ?)?V C2   (K + C) = 0
? (2(1  ?)V C   ?) 2 = K + C   1: (A-8)
Finally, substituting ? = ?E + (1   ?)V C gives the following conclusion: ? 2 [0; 1] is
the maximal real number such that
 
(1  ?)2 2V C   (?)2 2E

2 = K + C   1: (A-9)
Case 2: Suppose E = V C = . Because that the two principalsinterests are perfectly
aligned, this case features many solutions.
When 1   22  K + C, the monetary returns from the project are su¢ cient to pay
o¤ K and C. Given  2 [0; 1], the monetary payment that should be made to the VC (for
whom the participation constraint holds with equality) is R = K +C   (1  )(1 + 22).
If R > 0, the monetary payments need to be made by the entrepreneur to cover R calls for
(1 22)  K+C (1 )(1+22), the left-hand side giving us the monetary returns
allocated to the entrepreneur at  and the right-hand side the monetary payment needed to
be made to the VC. This implies (1   2)22  K + C   1. Hence, every  2 [0; 1] is a
solution, because then in all of them the entrepreneur obtains the highest returns which is due
to (1+22) R = (1+22) (K+C)+(1 )(1+22) = 1+22 (K+C)  0,
where the nal inequality is due to Assumption 1. Furthermore, the situation in which the
monetary payments to the entrepreneur from the project are not su¢ cient to pay o¤ the VC
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is not possible. This is because we need to have (1  2)22 < K   1, which contradicts
to the hypothesis that 1   22  K + C for any value of  2 [0; 1].
When 1   22 < K + C, the monetary returns from the project if the entrepreneur
were the sole owner are not su¢ cient to pay o¤K +C. The payment needed to be made for
a given level of  is R = K+C (1 )(1+22). Therefore, we have a solution if  is such
that (1 22)  K+C  (1 )(1+22) (which implies (1 2)22  K+C 1).
Note that ? = 0 and R? = K + C   (1 + 22) < 0 is such a solution (yet ? = 1 and
R? = K +C is not a solution in this case, because the monetary payments from the project
to the liquidity-constrained entrepreneur is not su¢ cient to cover K+C). The participation
constraint of the entrepreneur is clearly satised and he obtains the highest payo¤ possible:
(1+
22) R = (1+22)  (K+C)+(1 )(1+22) = 1+22  (K+C)  0.
Case 3: Suppose E < V C . In this case, the entrepreneurs problem shown in (A-3) calls
for choosing  as low as possible, because, when E < V C , ~E(;R) is strictly decreasing
and ~V C(;R) strictly increasing in . Moreover, the VC is not liquidity constrained. Finally,
because the entrepreneur makes a monetary return of  R = 1 + 2V C2   (K + C), which
strictly exceeds 1+ 2E2  (K +C)  0 due to Assumption 1, his participation constraint
is also satised. This is the unique solution of this case.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
There are three general cases to consider: case A: r? < V C < C , case B: V C < r? < C ,
case C: V C < C < r?. Due to the continuity of the payo¤ functions in every possible case,
it su¢ ces to check for strict inequalities.
Case A (r? < V C < C): The inequality r?  C implies r?K   C  0.
Case A-1 (E < r? < V C < C): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-
nancing is 1 + 2E2   (1 + r?)K, which is positive because E < r?. On the other
hand, his return by choosing VC-nancing is 1 + 2V C2   (K + C), which is positive
because E < V C < C . Hence, choosing VC-nancing instead of bank-nancing delivers
the entrepreneur a net payo¤ of (2V C   2E)2 + (r?K   C). Because that V C > E and
r?K   C > 0, (2V C   2E)2 + (r?K   C) > 0. Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRA 1E = V C: (A-10)
Case A-2 (r? < E < V C < C): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
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is 22E2, which is positive because E > r?. On the other hand, his return by choosing
VC-nancing is 1+ 2V C2  (K +C) > 0, which is positive because V C > E. Moreover,
because that r? < C , we have r?K C > 0. Consequently, 1+2V C2 (K+C) > 22E2,
because otherwise
0  1 + 2V C2   (K + C)  22E2
= 1 +
 
2V C   22E

2   (K + C) > 1   2E2   (K + C); (A-11)
contradicting to E  C . Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRA 2E = V C: (A-12)
Case A-3 (r? < V C < E < C): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 22E2, which is positive because r? < E. On the other hand, his return by choosing
VC-nancing is 1+2E2  (K +C) > 0, which is positive because V C < E < C . Thus,
bank-nancing cannot be a best response, because if it were 22E2  1+ 2E2  (K +C)
would result in1 2E2 (K+C)  0, a contradiction to E < C . Thus, the entrepreneurs
best response is
BRA 3E = V C: (A-13)
Case A-4 (r? < V C < C < E): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 22E2 > 0, which is positive because E > r?. On the other hand, his return by choosing
VC-nancing is 2?E(?E + (1   ?)V C)2 > 0 where ? is the maximal real number in
[0; 1] that satises the equation ((1  ?)22V C   ?22E)2 = K + C   1. Because that
2?E(
?E + (1  ?)V C)2 < 2?2E2  22E2; (A-14)
as a result of E > C > V C and ?  1, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRA 4E = B: (A-15)
Case B (V C < r? < C):
Case B-1 (E < V C < r? < C): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 1+2E2  (1+ r?)K, which is positive because E < r?. On the other hand, his return
by choosing VC-nancing is 1+2V C2 (K+C), which is positive because E < V C < C .
Hence, choosing VC-nancing instead of bank-nancing delivers the entrepreneur a net payo¤
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of (2V C   2E)2 + (r?K   C). Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRB 1E =
8><>:
V C if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
(A-16)
Case B-2 (V C < E < r? < C): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 1 + 2E2   (1 + r?)K > 0, which is positive because E < r?. On the other hand, his
return by choosing VC-nancing is 1+2E2 (K+C), which is positive because V C < E.
Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRB 2E =
8><>:
V C if r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
(A-17)
Case B-3 (V C < r? < E < C): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 1 + 2E2   (1   2E2) = 22E2 > 0. On the other hand, his return by choosing VC-
nancing is 1 + 2E2   (K + C), which is positive because V C < E < C . Thus, bank-
nancing cannot be a strict best response, because if it were 22E2 > 1+ 
2
E2  (K +C)
would result in 1   2E2   (K +C) < 0, a contradiction to the condition E < C . Thus,
the entrepreneurs best response is
BRB 3E = V C: (A-18)
Case B-4 (V C < r? < C < E): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 22E2, which is positive because r? < E. On the other hand, his return by choosing
VC-nancing is 2?E(?E + (1   ?)V C)2 > 0 where ? is the maximal real number in
[0; 1] that satises the equation ((1  ?)22V C   ?22E)2 = K + C   1. We have that
2?E(
?E + (1  ?)V C)2 < 2?2E2  22E2; (A-19)
as a result of V C < E. This also implies ? < 1 because E > C . Thus, the entrepreneurs
best response is
BRB 4E = B: (A-20)
Case C (V C < C < r?):
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Case C-1 (E < V C < C < r?): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 1+2E2  (1+ r?)K, which is positive because E < r?. On the other hand, his return
by choosing VC-nancing is 1+2V C2 (K+C), which is positive because E < V C < C .
Hence, choosing VC-nancing instead of bank-nancing delivers the entrepreneur a net payo¤
of (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C. Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRC 1E =
8><>:
V C if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if (2V C   2E)2 + r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
(A-21)
Case C-2 (V C < E < C < r?): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 1 + 2E2   (1 + r?)K > 0, which is positive because E < r?. On the other hand, his
return by choosing VC-nancing is 1+2E2 (K+C), which is positive because V C < E.
Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRC 2E =
8><>:
V C if r?K   C > 0
fB; V Cg if r?K   C = 0
B otherwise.
(A-22)
Case C-3 (V C < C < E < r?): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 1 + 2E2   (1 + r?)K > 0, which is positive because E < r?. On the other hand, his
return by choosing VC-nancing is 2?E(?E+(1 ?)V C)2 > 0 where ? is the maximal
real number in [0; 1] that satises the equation ((1   ?)22V C   ?22E)2 = K + C   1.
But, because that
1 + 
2
E2   (1 + r?)K < 2?E(?E + (1  ?)V C)2 < 22E (A-23)
due to ?  1 and V C  C < E, we obtain
1   2E2   (1 + r?)K < 0; (A-24)
implying E > r?, a contradiction. Thus, the entrepreneurs best response is
BRC 3E = B: (A-25)
Case C-4 (V C < C < r? < E): An entrepreneurs return by choosing bank-nancing
is 22E2, which is positive because r? < E. On the other hand, his return by choosing
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VC-nancing is 2?E(?E + (1   ?)V C)2 > 0 where ? is the maximal real number in
[0; 1] that satises the equation ((1  ?)22V C   ?22E)2 = K + C   1. We have that
2?E(
?E + (1  ?)V C)2 < 2?2E2  22E2 (A-26)
as a result of V C < E. This also implies ? < 1 because E > C . Thus, the entrepreneurs
best response is
BRC 4E = B: (A-27)
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